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THE IMIUTUAL FUND MANAGEMENT FEE
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR ROBERT H. MUNDHEIM: This afternoon we depart
from the more academic subject of this morning's discussion, and talk
about money issues. The Commission's recommendations in this
area, if accepted, presumably would lower the cost to the investing
public of investing in mutual funds and correspondingly would reduce
the profits of those who sponsor mutual funds.
We shall look first at the problem of management fees-the
amounts paid by mutual funds for investment advisory and adminis-
trative services. The Commission's conclusion in the area is that
investors in mutual fund shares have not benefited sufficiently from
the economies of size which are characteristic of the industry.'
In addition the Commission has concluded that if the public is to
get a fair share of these economies of size, there is a need for greater
involvment by an outside force-ultimately, a court-in setting
proper levels for management fees.2 The normal bias in our economy
is against interference by outside forces in the setting of prices. Thus,
the burden would seem to be on the proponent of such interference to
make a case for its necessity.
The Commission, which relies heavily on the Wharton School
Study in this area, rests its case on a finding that competitive forces
which normally exert restraints on prices do not operate effectively in
the fee area. This means, on the one hand, that funds are not able to
shop around for investment advice, and on the other, that the buying
public is either unaware of the differences in the fees charged to
various funds, or that the buying public does not have an opportunity
to focus effectively on the management fee issue alone, because other
features loom much larger at the time the investor makes his choice
among various funds.
In Chapter III of its report, which deals with management fees,
the Commission evaluates other potential restraints on the fees
charged to the fund. The Commission focuses on the ability of the
unaffiliated directors to exert an effective influence on management
I Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Public Policy Implications of Investment Com-
pany Growth, H.R. REP No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as SEC Mutual Fund Report].
2Id. at 13.
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fees and examines the efficacy of shareholder litigation. It found both
of these restraints of minimal value.
3
Thus, the Commission concluded that a new restraint was neces-
sary. Its recommendation was that the Investment Company Act
should be amended to provide that compensation paid for services fur-
nished to a mutual fund must be reasonable.4 You must admit that
there is a certain artistry in the way that is put, because if you don't
agree with their recommendation, then you are forced to say that
the fees should be unreasonable-and nobody would say that.
The Commission set out certain factors which should be con-
sidered in determining what is reasonable compensation.' I hope that
in the course of this afternoon's discussion we shall get some en-
lightenment on the meaning of the standards used in determining
reasonable compensation. In addition, I hope we will be able to make
some judgments about the extent to which the Commission has
correctly analyzed the problem, and perhaps discuss some alternative
ways of dealing with the kinds of problems, if any, which we can
agree do exist.
FINDINGS OF THE WHARTON SCHOOL STUDY
Since the Wharton School Study provides much of the material
for the Commission's analysis in this field, I think it is appropriate to
start by asking Professor Herman, who was one of the co-authors of
the study, to begin our discussion.
PROFESSOR EDWARD S. HERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What I would like to do is outline briefly the factual basis for
the criticisms of mutual fund management fee rates, as developed in
the Wharton report and the SEC report, then comment very briefly
on the industry replies to these criticisms, and finally offer a few
comments on policy and standards.
In the Wharton School report we examined the management fee
rates for externally managed mutual funds, for internally managed
funds-funds managed by their own boards of directors or trustees
without an external management-and for the noninvestment company
clients of investment advisers who also managed mutual funds.
We were fortunate to have been able to collect information from
at least fifty-four investment advisers who managed the assets of
mutual funds and other clients. We had evidence on the expense
3Id. at 148.
4 Id. at 144.
5Ibid.
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ratios of these advisers for both classes of customers, and on the fee
rates which they charged.
Our findings were roughly as follows: that the management fee
rates of externally managed funds were significantly higher than those
for internally managed funds, and very much higher than those
charged noninvestment company clients at comparable asset levels.'
Also the rates of the externally managed funds were less responsive
to variations in size, for all funds at a given time and for individual
funds over time.' In 1960, twenty-six of the forty largest investment
advisers charged fees of one-half of one per cent or more." And in
1960 there was no statistically significant relationship between the
size of the fund and the management fee rate charged.'
Also, as I mentioned, we found that over time the management
fee rates didn't change very much, regardless of asset changes. There
were a number of cases of asset changes of 500 per cent or more over
the 'fifties which produced no change in the management fee rate.10
The rates for the externally managed funds were especially unre-
sponsive to changes in size, remaining very heavily concentrated
around the traditional one-half of one per cent level."
We then asked this question: Can the greater amount and the
lesser flexibility of the rates of the externally managed funds be ex-
plained by the services they perform or by the costs that they incur in
managing these assets? This, of course, would not explain any
difference between externally and internally managed funds, since
they both are mutual funds, and the nature of the expenses which are
incurred are comparable.
For the management fee rate we made an analysis in which
we imputed to the internally managed funds the costs of services
comparable to those provided by the externally managed funds. The
costs for the internally managed funds were significantly lower. 2 We
found that on the basis of a detailed study of the expenses of investment
advisers that as the size of assets managed increased, the expense
ratios of the adviser fell substantially. The sharpest decrease in ex-
pense ratio was experienced by investment advisers who only had
investment company clients. The economies of scale for fifty-four
6Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R.
REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 485-91 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wharton
Report].
7 Id. at 489-91.
8Id. at 482.
9 Id. at 490.
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 482-83, 490.
12 Id. at 485.
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advisers who managed both mutual fund and noninvestment company
assets were not as great as those for the investment advisers who only
had investment company clients.1
3
The Expense of Serving Mutual Funds Compared to Noninvestment
Company Clients
The most important of our findings regarding the fees charged
mutual funds and noninvestment company clients concerns the relative
expense of serving the two kinds of clients. In our study of the
fifty-four investment advisers who had both mutual fund and non-
investment company clients, we found that the higher the proportion
of noninvestment company assets managed, the higher the adviser's
expense ratio. 4 This conclusion and other statistical evidence seemed
to demonstrate quite conclusively that mutual fund assets are less
expensive to manage than the assets of other clients.
Now, this is entirely plausible, since mutual fund shareholders do
not require individual portfolio attention or individual reports. Also,
some of the major expenses of mutual fund administration, such as
reports to shareholders, costs of annual meetings, transfer agent costs,
dividend disbursing costs and custodial fees are typically absorbed by
the fund and the shareholders, not by the investment adviser.
The evidence thus indicated that the cost to the investment
advisers of managing mutual fund assets was less than that for manag-
ing comparable levels of assets for other clients. In spite of this, the
management fees charged mutual funds tended to exceed those charged
other clients by a large margin, frequently in excess of 100 per cent.
The SEC report extends our examination of the fee rates
charged noninvestment company clients. The report indicates that
the management costs of pension funds and other large clients are
also substantially lower than those charged mutual funds of com-
parable size.'"
I repeat this crucial conclusion from our study: the ordinary run
of noninvestment company clients costs more per dollar to manage
than do mutual funds. Also, the expenses of managing mutual funds
falls sharply as their size increases. Therefore, the explanation for
the higher and less flexible management fee rates of mutual funds must
be found elsewhere than in expenses incurred or services rendered.
13 Id. at 499-503. Curiously, the expense ratios for advisers who managed mutual
fund assets of over $300 million were not necessarily less than the expense ratio for
advisers who managed assets of about $300 million.
14 Id. at 501-02.
15 SEC Mutual Fund Report 114-21.
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The Industry Justification for the Cost-Rate Discrepancy
I have yet to see an industry explanation or justification of this
cost-rate discrepancy. The typical response of the industry has avoided
the substantive question of the cost-rate relationship and has con-
centrated on whether an individual shareholder could obtain a lower
management fee rate through some other channel. This is the heart
of the "emphatic rebuttal" to the SEC discussion of management fee
rates just issued by Mr. Shelley of Vance, Sanders & Co. 6
The argument that the small shareholder "could not do better
elsewhere," although worthy of note, really fails to come to grips with
the central issues. If the mutual fund is a single account, managed
as a single investment entity, why do the management fees which it
pays fail to reflect observable cost variations? Mr. Shelley never
answers this, and we are still waiting to hear a response to this point
from the representatives of the industry.
Secondly, in considering the management contract, is the re-
sponsibility of a director of a fund exhausted when he has established
that the shareholder, whose interests he is supposed to represent, has
no better option? Presumably the director of the fund observes that
expense ratios decline as asset size grows. He observes that there is a
scaled rate for other clients. He observes that there is a difference be-
tween the fee rates charged other clients and the mutual fund, and still,
presumably, he is supposed to conclude, according to Mr. Shelley's logic,
that the management fee rate is satisfactory because the mutual fund
shareholder could not do better anywhere else.
The Relationship Between Industry Structure and Management Fees
Let me offer an explanation for the behavior of the management
fee rates in the mutual fund industry. Basically, the structure of
the industry, with an external adviser and a mutual fund shell, seems
to generate high rates. There is such a strong correlation between
the existence of an external adviser and relatively high management
fee rates that one must attribute the high rates, at least in part, to the
existence of this structural characteristic of the industry.
This observation simply reports an empirical fact. The cor-
relation between external advisers and high management fee rates may
be explained by the ability of the external adviser relationship to hide
a layer of relatively obscure income claimants. Furthermore, the
external adviser-mutual fund relationship presents to the shareholder
an unreal picture of fund independence and fund capacity to bargain.
Stripping away this shell, by forcing all the funds to be internally
managed, would be a simple device which, of course, would be rather
16 Letter from William F. Shelley, January 26, 1967.
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drastic at this late stage in the industry's development, and I suspect
that Mr. Welch would object to this solution. But it definitely would
attack a structural characteristic of the industry that is generating
high rates, and it would bring about a lowering of rates without the
continuing intervention that otherwise might be necessary.
I am somewhat ambivalent about this solution because by itself
it would not lower rates to the levels obtained by other large clients.
The reason for this is that the high management fee rates are not
solely a function of the organizational structure of the industry. They
also reflect the inability of the small shareholder to bargain on this
question, and I see no feasible way of improving his bargaining
position. For this reason I would support the application of some
sort of rule of reason, such as the SEC has proposed, as a kind of
stand-by authority, with the standards presumably derived from the
competitive rates that are established in those areas where there is a
bargaining process that permits a truly negotiated rate.
THE INDUSTRY VIEW OF MANAGEMENT FEE RATES
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Joe Welch, who is president of the
Wellington Fund, has obviously had an inside view of how manage-
ment fee rates are set, and I suppose that your views, Joe, differ some-
what from Ed's.
MR. JOSEPH E. WELCH: You are entirely right, Bob. Mine are
a little different.
My remarks are based on an assumption that we're still living
in a free country with free enterprise, subject only to the proper rules
and regulations to avoid and control abuses.
I'd like to say at the very outset that, certainly, I agree that
management fees should be reasonable It naturally follows, there-
fore, that I favor reductions in management fees through some form
of sliding scale as funds grow in size. But, having said that, I must
also say first, that I am strongly opposed to having management fees
controlled, directly or indirectly, by a government agency, no matter
how well intentioned that agency may be; second, that I see no need
for such regulation. Remedies and safeguards to control excessive
fees, in my judgment, already exist.
The Nature of the Investment Adviser's Business
The management of other people's money, whether directly for
individual investors, or indirectly through a mutual fund, is a pro-
fessional personal service business. It is highly competitive business.
There is no monopoly. There is no limited right of entry. There
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is full disclosure of all costs, not only at the time of purchase of
mutual fund shares, but at least three times every year thereafter
through reports and proxy statements. Thus an investor has a wide
choice of funds, not only with different objectives and investment
policies, but also with different cost of management, which runs
anywhere from an eighth of one per cent to one-half of one per cent.
I know of no instance where governmental control of rates has
been imposed on a personal service industry that is as competitive as
the mutual fund industry. Rather, I believe that the matter should
be left to the natural forces of competition, which I am sure in time
will cure any problems that may exist.
The Argument Against Government Regulation of Fees
My second point is that I feel there is no need for government
regulation of management fees at this time. I say this, first of all,
because the directors of mutual funds today, I believe, are fully aware
of their responsibility to see to it that the manager properly performs
the service he has contracted to perform, and that the fee paid for
this service is reasonable. Evidence of the recognition of the re-
sponsibilities of directors is apparent, I think, in the meaningful re-
ductions in management fees paid by most of the large funds. A
recent tabulation by Mr. Shelley, to which you referred, Ed, shows
that of all of the funds with assets of $100 million or over the average
management fee is 3/100 of 1 per cent-essentially three-eighths-and
many of these companies have even lower rates." I believe these rates
will become even lower as more money comes in at the brackets where
the sliding scales begin to take effect. And if this fact is not enough
evidence of the responsibility-and the recognition of that responsi-
bility-by directors, it must be remembered that if shareholders become
dissatisfied with what their own directors are doing, they do have
remedies through recourse to the courts, where the decision will be
made as to whether or not the management fees that are paid are
or are not excessive.
On this particular point, the long period of lawsuits throughout
the industry,' the publicity on the issuance of the Wharton School
report and now the SEC report, have made all directors even more
conscious of their responsibilities, and beyond that, the great risk that
they run if they fail to discharge these responsibilities.
l1Id. at 1.
1s The law suits attacking mutual fund fees are discussed in SEC Mutual Fund
Report 132-43; Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation
Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20
RuTGERS L. REv. 181 (1966).
[Vo1.115:726
THE MANAGEMENT FEE
With these safeguards already available and becoming more
forceful every day, I just cannot see the need for the legislative
proposals with respect to management fees.
Criteria for Measuring the Reasonableness of the Management Fee
I would like to spend just a moment, Bob, if I may, on the
report's suggestions as to the criteria to be used to measure whether
or not management fees are reasonable. In other words, just what
should a board of directors consider when they either renew a
management contract or when they submit a new one for share-
holder approval?
First of all, in my judgment, the directors should do just what
Al Smith always recommended: look at the record. Thus they can
see how well the fund has performed under the manager's guidance
in the light of its stated objectives and investment policies. As was
said here earlier this morning, that is the real test of performance:
have you met the objectives of the fund in the light of its policies?
The board also should acquaint itself with the quality and depth
of the management organization, and thus evaluate its ability to
continue to provide competent management as people change from
year to year, and to provide in future years competent service for
the fund.
In reviewing the rate of a management fee these factors-the
record, the quality and the depth of the management team-should be
given great weight. The board should satisfy itself that the fee is
reasonable when measured against the record and the cost of similar
services that might be available to the average mutual fund investor.
And here I do depart from you somewhat, Ed, and your state-
ment that a mutual fund is just one account to manage. This may
be the legal interpretation, but I think from a practical point of view
we are managing, in our case, the money of 300-and-some-odd-
thousand individual accounts.
The Management Fee Compared With Bank Charges
The SEC report suggests a comparison with the cost of bank
management of pension funds.' 9 Well, a lot has been said about that
today, and I'm not going to elaborate, except to say that I do not
believe this comparison is appropriate. I do, however, agree that
comparisons with bank charges are perfectly valid, and would suggest
a comparison with bank charges on their common trust funds, which
are similar to mutual funds.
19 SEC Mutual Fund Report 114-18.
19671
734 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
As you all know, the bank common trust funds are designed to
serve the small or modest-sized trust accounts, as mutual funds are
designed primarily to serve the small investor. In these common
trust funds the banks assess the management charge directly against
the individual participant-the individual participating trust, if you
will-which I think is an entirely appropriate way to do it.
In a publication which the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Com-
pany of New York released last year, there is included a scale of fees
charged to the participants in its common trust funds. For an invest-
ment of $5,000 the charge is 5 per cent, as compared to the average
of 3%0oo of 1 per cent for the average mutual fund for an account
of $10,000 in size--which is the average holding of most mutual fund
shareholders-the average charge is 2Y2 per cent, as compared to the
,Aoo that I mentioned earlier. Not until the participating trust
reached the sum of $100,000 or more would the fee charged by the
bank against that particular trust be equal to the fees charged for
a similar amount by the average mutual fund.
I have quoted the New York rate, which I believe is reduced
somewhat by banks outside of New York; for example, in Boston
the rate of charge at $5,000 is just 12 per cent; and at $10,000,
sA00 of 1 per cent.
Another meaningful comparison, I believe, would be the rate
of the fee charged by the first bank-sponsored mutual fund to be
registered with the SEC. Here the management fee is set at a straight
one-half of one per cent, with no provision for reduction of the fee
as the fund grows in size.
That charges made by banks provide a valid means of comparison
is evidenced further, I believe, by the fact that the banks are the
largest money managers, with total investment accounts of well over
$100 billion, perhaps nearly three times as much as the entire mutual
fund industry put together.
But despite the fact that they are managing all of this money,
if you or I were to walk into the trust department of a bank, with
$10,000 or $20,000 or a little bit more, the fee that they would charge
would be related to that particular amount of money, and would not
be reduced because of the many billions of dollars that the bank also
manages in its trust department. In other words, each account is
treated individually and not as part of an aggregate.
The Management Fee and Performance
As I said at the outset, I believe that management fees should
be reasonable, and I think they are reasonable when measured against
[Voi.115:726
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the real test, which is the results achieved. For example, a recent
publication by Arthur Wiesenberger & Co. shows the relative perform-
ance of growth funds, growth and income funds and balanced funds
for the last ten years. 0 I calculated the performance of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average for the same period and made the same
adjustments Wiesenberger did for income. The results follow: for
the ten-year period the Dow Jones Average showed a gain, adjusted
for income, of 106 per cent. The outright growth funds showed an
average gain of 153 per cent; the growth with income funds, 116
per cent; and the balanced funds, with between 30 and 40 per cent of
their assets in senior securities showed a gain of 91 per cent.
Now, as I have said, the real test depends, in my judgment, upon
the results achieved, and I believe that the performance record of
mutual funds over the years has been excellent. For the average
investor, in my judgment, three things are desirable: diversification,
competent management and convenient services. Mutual funds make
all of these desirable elements available in a wide variety of forms,
each fully competitive with the other. I know of no other way in
which an investor can obtain these services at such a reasonable cost.
To conclude, let me repeat again that management fees should be
reasonable, that they should be reduced on a scale based on the growth
in the size of the fund. I would strongly oppose, however, any effort
to regulate management fees in a highly competitive business, and
suggest that it is wrong for a government agency to substitute its own
judgment for that of a competent board of directors. I really think
that the record makes it clear that there is no need for legislation at
this time.
IS THE MANAGEMENT FEE AFFECTED BY COMPETITION?
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: As I listened to Joe and Ed, it seemed
to me one area of dispute is whether or not there is competition that
affects the compensation structure. Ed seems to think there isn't;
Joe seems to think there is adequate competition and numerous alterna-
tives. It is the existence of alternatives which Joe suggests justifies
the existing structure and rates.
I wonder whether I could sound out the members of the panel
as to how they feel about the ability of competition to work effectively
in this area. Is the presence or absence of competition a factor of
prime importance?
MR. ALLAN F. CONWILL: I'll undertake to answer that par-
tially, Bob.
20A. Wiz SN.BERiGz & Co., INVFSTMFNT COMPA ES 1966 (26th ed. 1966).
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First of all, I think that the mutual fund industry, as such, is
as intensely competitive as any industry I know. However, I do not
believe that the management fee is really an element of the competition.
Joe Welch has pointed out to you what is quite true, that manage-
ment costs are readily available and clearly disclosed to the stock-
holder. I rather doubt, however, if the stockholder pays a great deal
of attention to them in making his investment decision. Indeed, I
would surmise that Brother Pomerantz has had more to do with
bringing the fee rates down than the competitive aspects.
MR. ROBERT M. LOEFFLER: Competition is a difficult element to
appraise. I think that competitive forces are at work on the manage-
ment fee, and to that extent my view may be different from Allan's.
It's a subtle influence, but it is there, and I think it is becoming in-
creasingly important.
I don't have a lot of industry data available but I do have the
data on IDS.
I think these figures show that developments in the fund industry
are characteristic of any industry that is young and realizes a period
of almost sensational growth. In the fund industry that growth com-
menced during the decade of the 'fifties.
Competitive forces come into play after the growth period. They
don't coincide with this dramatic growth. I don't think the SEC
report takes into account the developments and trends of the most
recent few years. In deference to the gentleman on my left, Mr.
Pomerantz, I think I would have to acknowledge, as Allan did, that
the commencement of the interplay of the competitive forces might
have been triggered a little bit by him. But, having been triggered,
I think they are working.
Let me take just these figures from IDS's standpoint for a
moment. IDS manages four funds. One of them is a small bond
and preferred fund, and I think I'll leave out the figures for that one,
and take the other three.
Investors Mutual, had assets as of December 31, 1966 of
$2,760,000,000; Investors Stock Fund, had assets of $1,736,000,000
and Investors Variable Payment, had assets of $588,000,000. So I
think we are talking about larger funds.
Investors Mutual was founded in 1940. Investors Stock Fund
was founded in 1945. Investors Variable Payment Fund began its
operations in 1957. The growth of these funds has been great, as
evidenced by their present size.
There was no change in the management contracts of these funds,
as they related to management fees, until the impact of the sensational
THE MANAGEMENT FEE
growth of the 1950's was fully realized in the early 1960's, and Mr.
Pomerantz came on the scene. In 1963, the fund management con-
tracts were changed, with a little persuasion from Mr. Pomerantz,
and the change went into effect in 1963.
Starting at that point, sliding scales reflecting operating economies
and the growth of the fund size were put into effect. At the same
time all of the expenses of the funds, some of which had theretofore
been assumed and paid directly by the funds, were paid by IDS
out of the management fee, so that thereafter the management fee
and the expense ratio has been identical.
In 1964, with the continued growth of the funds-greater growth
than, I suppose, had been anticipated-negotiations with the committee
representing the unaffiliated directors of the funds resulted in a new
contract further reducing the management fee.
In 1966 another amendment was incorporated into the manage-
ment contract to reflect the fact that IDS had acquired, through a
subsidiary, membership on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange. Pro-
vision was made in the contract to provide that the management fee
would be reduced by an amount equivalent to the profit realized by
the brokerage operation.
Now, giving the effect to these events, all of which have tran-
spired, in the last few years, the expense ratios of the funds have
dropped: in the case of Investors Mutual, from .54 in 1956 to .33
in 1966; or from $27 to $16.50 on a $5,000 account (our average
size), or 39 per cent. In the case of Stock Fund from .57 in 1956
to .36 in 1966, or a dollar reduction from $28.50 to $18 on a $5,000
account, a 37 per cent reduction. In Variable, which had its first full
year of operation in 1958, the reduction in the expense ratio has been
from .67 in 1958 to .34 in 1966. The over-all average has been a
41 per cent reduction from .58 in 1956 to .34 in 1966, or from $29
to $17, on a $5,000 account.
Now, I think that these figures evidence the fact that competitive
forces are at work, and that the present structure does work. These
last reductions occurred through extensive negotiations with a com-
mittee representing the unaffiliated directors of the funds. Perhaps
I should mention that at IDS the funds have a president, a vice
president and general counsel, and a secretary, three officers who are
full-time officers of the fund, unaffiliated in any way with IDS.
I think these figures reflect the fact that competitive forces must
be exerting themselves, or else IDS has become an eleemosynary in-
stitution, in which case we'll have a difficult time accounting to our
own shareholders. These reductions have occurred because when we
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periodically sit down and look at the fee, and when the unaffiliated
directors of the funds do so, we look at the other funds to see: what
they are doing, what their expense ratios are and what they are
charging. We know we have to take these forces into account, and if
we don't take them into account, they are forcefully pointed out to us.
I'm sure that the other larger funds particularly, can demonstrate
similar records. I'm sure that Joe Welch can with Wellington Fund.
If I'm not mistaken, I think the expense ratio at Wellington Fund
has dropped to around .34.
So these forces do come into play. This is a competitive industry
which reflects competitive influence in the negotiation and establish-
ment of the management fee.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE MUTUAL FUND STRUCTURE
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I noticed that Abe was scribbling away
furiously. I just wondered if that was because you had never heard
so much praise coming from an industry source?
MR. ABRAHAM L. POMERANTZ: I must say, I have been called
less gentle things in the past than "trigger."
I enjoyed the accolade, although I think the praise, as always
when coming from your erstwhile adversary, tends to be somewhat
excessive, and even hyperbolic. I would like to go on because I think
you set a nice note for me when in your opening remarks you dis-
tinguished the esoteric discussion of this morning from the hoped-for
more monetary discussion of this afternoon. In the discussion so far
there has been a lot of talk involving those slippery terms, "reason-
able" and "fair." Defendant's fees are always fair, and plaintiffs say
they are unfair, and to my mind this is an exercise in semantics which
doesn't advance the polemic any.
My quarrel with Joe Welch, with whom I settled my litigation
not so many years ago-and three other gentlemen surrounding me
with whom I have settled cases-makes me feel that I am in the camp
of the enemy, albeit very amiable enemies. I have settled my money
dispute with you, but my ideological dispute carries on, Joe, and Al
Jaretzki and Allan Conwill and Bob Loeffler, representing four dif-
ferent sets of malefactors of great wealth.
You know, Harlan Stone wrote-I guess, over a quarter of a
century ago-and I'd like to put this problem in its broad frame of
reference-that when the history of this period gets written-and
Harlan Stone had a pretty good vantage point on this period-the
greatest menace, the greatest evil, in our society-and these were
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measured, judicial terms-was the violation of an ancient Biblical
precept that no man can serve two masters;2 1 and by extension-this
is my editing of Stone-where there is conflict between self-interest and
fiduciary duty, you and I know who comes out on top.
Now, this is about the birds and the bees of the American cor-
porate scene; and of all dualities and of all conflicts on this scene,
nothing-but nothing-approaches the open end mutual fund for
incestuous relationships.
The fund is conceived by a bunch of people whom we call advisers
or managers. "Manager" is a good shorthand term. This group
gives birth to the fund. The fund is manned by the advisers. If I may
carry on the figure of speech, the umbilical cord is never cut after
birth, as would be true in ordinary biological life.
The Unafiliated Director
The principal safeguard provided by the Investment Company
Act, against overreaching by managers or advisers, is the so-called
unaffiliated director, which means in plain English a presumably
independent director, which in turn means that he is supposed to safe-
guard the public-he's a watchdog-against the human tendency of
management to take as much as they can get away with, short of
being caught by us cops, or triggers, or the SEC or someone else.
If I speak in rather unmodulated or brusque terms, you will for-
give me, because I'm trying to communicate.
Who picks the unaffiliated directors? The affiliated men pick the
unaffiliated men. The men who need to be watched pick the watchdogs
to watch them.
Now, in its wisdom-and no sarcasm is intended-the statute has
erected certain mechanical things which a man must avoid being in
order to be an independent or unaffiliated director. For example, he
mustn't own stock in the adviser. He mustn't be an officer or director
in the adviser or manager or underwriter.22
But obviously, you know and I know that if you are choosing an
unaffiliated director or an independent director you are not going to
choose anybody who is going to be too hard on you. You are going
to tend to pick a friend of yours; and may I say again, as a footnote,
that in my litigation I have encountered two situations where a
so-called unaffiliated or independent director happened to be the son
of the leading stockholder of the adviser.
21 Stone, The Public Influenwe of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1934).
22 Investment Company Act § 10, 54 Stat 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1964).
An "affiiated person" is defined in § 2(a) (3), 54 Stat. 791 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2
(a) (3) (1964).
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Now, how funny can you get? And yet with straight countenance
under oath the testimony was that the son was going to "call them
as he sees them," to coin a phrase, and he was not going to be partial
to his father.
All I'm getting to, in my usual long-winded way, is my quarrel
with Joe Welch and with the rest of the men around here about free
enterprise. I am in favor of free enterprise, and I'm in favor of
democracy and all the other eternal verities, but when you have a
situation which is so fraught with mischief, what is needed is more
rather than less SEC supervision-or, to use that harsh word, "regu-
lation." Remember this industry has $40 billion of the public's money
and roughly 4 million investors.
The Argument That Stockholder Ratification Is Meaningless
One of the recommendations for reform proposed by the SEC
is that the court should not be bound by stockholders' approval or
ratification of the fees under attack, in cases where the court finds them
excessive. The recommendation is that when the trial judge appraises
the fairness of fees paid to management, he may disregard the fact of
stockholder approval or ratification. This is terribly important because
every stockholder's action charging excessiveness that has gone to trial
has been nonsuited or dismissed by judges who may have felt that the
fees were excessive--but who felt bound to follow the presumed will
of the shareholders expressed in stockholders' ratifications.
Here again we have theory in conflict with reality.
Despite all the disclosure required by the vigilant Phil Loomis
and his SEC associates, it is a simple fact of life known to any
sophisticated lawyer that stockholders' ratification can be had for the
asking; it is not a real exercise in corporate democracy. I don't have
statistics, but I know from my professional observation that when you
put to shareholders the question of ratification or approval of a
management contract, say, at page 43 of a 51 page proxy statement,
as Resolution No. 4, sandwiched between some innocent-sounding
resolution to increase capitalization and another resolution equally less
than world-shaking, and then when you trot out the proxy solicitors
to "bring out" the vote-you can get the stockholders to vote for
almost anything you put before them.
I want, in closing this set of remarks, to suggest that the SEC's
recommendation is not more than a mild corrective: the proposal
would permit the court to make a judgment as to what is a fair fee
unhampered by a ratification procured by the very persons who are
using it to hold on to their self-awarded fees.
THE MANAGEMENT FEE
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Joe, we ought to come back and give
you a chance to say a few words.
Influence of the Unalffiiated Director
MR. WELCH: First of all, I'd say that you're a pretty tough
man to debate with, Abe.
Secondly, I don't want you, Abe, to get a swelled head over the
praise you have had here this afternoon. For the record I want to
make it clear that many funds had reductions in fees-meaningful re-
ductions-long before any litigation.
Abe, I don't think you give nearly enough credit to the dedica-
tion of the independent directors in seeing to it that the shareholders
are protected. If you would attend some of our board meetings, you
would find that our life is not always pleasant. We give to our
directors every month not only a record of what we have done as
managers, but also we regularly give them our performance record
against other comparable funds. Throughout the year we give them
material on what other funds are charging for investment advice.
We keep them fully informed; they demand that they be kept fully
informed. And as I said before, I think these fellows are performing
a very dedicated duty as independent directors.
Our fees, and many others, were reduced many, many years ago,
and are continually being reduced as we grow in size. Not all of
this is attributable to the independent directors, but certainly they
are acting as watchdogs, and I agree with what Bob Loeffler has said.
In his case there is a dramatic example of the distinction between
insiders and outside watchdogs.
So I think that the role of the independent director is being
criticized too much. I think they do a job, and I think they are
going to continue to do a better job.
The Position of the Commission Report
MR. PHILIP A. Loo Is, JR.: I would like to make some observa-
tions, which, as Frank pointed out this morning, may be heresy, upon
what the other speakers have said.
I find myself agreeing in part and disagreeing in part with every-
thing that has been said, and I think that the Commissioners' report,
in effect, reflects that uncomfortable middle position.
As to what Mr. Herman had to say, he provided us and the
industry and everybody else, with a convincing exposition, that a
problem does exist; that the fees in the externally managed mutual
fund field are somewhat higher than in other comparable forms of
investment management-and I will not for the moment get into the
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dispute about whether pension funds are a comparable form or not.
They are similar, but by no means the same.
He also showed-and this, I think, was one of the most striking
things shown by the Wharton School Study-that the economies of
scale that are available as mutual funds grow were not being passed
on at that time to investors in any adequate degree.
We recognize that since then, due, perhaps, to Abe Pomerantz
and to increased awareness on the part of independent directors-I
think, not due to competition-there has been a greater tendency on
the part of the larger funds to pass on these economies of scale, and
to scale down the fees in a more meaningful way. However, as the
Commission's report showed, this does not happen in every case, and
in some cases it happens in a rather token way.
At the same time, to the extent that there is some overtone in
Mr. Herman's remarks that the Commission should get into regulating
fees in a scientific way-the report does not suggest that. The reasons
why that was not proposed are, among other things, explained by
Joe Welch. This is a personal service business for which rate regu-
lation in any of its previously known forms does not exist, and should
not exist.
Consequently, we go back to two things which are, I think,
rather fundamental: First, as Joe Welch said, investment advisory
fees should be reasonable. Everybody agrees on that. Second, as
Mr. Pomerantz pointed out with considerable pungency, the invest-
ment adviser is a fiduciary to the stockholders of the fund. I don't
think anybody denies that either. That means that he owes them a
duty and a responsibility not only to perform as well as he can but
to charge fees which are reasonable.
Enforcing Standards of Fiduciary Responsibility
It has always been the law that the charges made by a fiduciary
to his beneficiary, at least where arm's length bargaining doesn't
exist-and I think that none of you will contend that the mutual fund
shareholder bargains at arm's length with the management over the
fee-the law has traditionally stepped in to make sure that the
standards of fiduciary conduct were observed.
Abe Pomerantz has pointed out some practical and procedural
obstacles to the enforcement of that fiduciary responsibility under
existing law-particularly the position that if the stockholders ratify,
then the court has to find not merely that the fee is unreasonable, but
that what is going on amounts to waste-misconduct of a gross
sort-before the court will intervene; and the courts very properly
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do not wish to charge mutual fund managers, who are responsible and
loyal people, with personal misconduct, breach of trust or waste of
the corporate assets. Hence judicial control doesn't operate very well.
Nor does the Commission have a very effective weapon in this
field. The Commission shouldn't go into rate regulation, but I think
it is part of the Commission's function to endeavor to see that fiduciar)
responsibilities are observed.
I must take issue rather strongly with the suggestion in Joe
Welch's remarks-and even more the suggestion in Mr. Shelley's
memorandum-that the standard of fiduciary conduct here is fully
discharged if you are able to satisfy yourself that the individual share-
holder couldn't do nearly as well if he had tried to run his own little
mutual fund all by himself with his own $2,000. Obviously that
is true; he couldn't do it. But that doesn't mean that the fiduciary
duty is discharged. This raises a very difficult problem in the
law of fiduciaries. Everybody can see that when a person serves as
trustee for a widow or an orphan, he's got to treat him fairly. The
courts have and will step in to protect these people. But what of the
obligation where, as Joe Welch has said, you are a fiduciary for
350,000 persons, to no one of whom your fee is more than peanuts?
Mr. Loeffler has pointed out that in the case of Investors Mutual,
where I suspect there was rather more arm's length bargaining between
the fund and IDS than generally goes on, they were able by a very
difficult process of hard work to reach the point where the cost to the
average stockholder was reduced from $27 to $16.
If I were an IDS stockholder, I don't think I would regard
that by any means as the most important aspect of my investment.
If I had $6,000 at stake, I'd be more interested in how they performed;
and this is the paramount reason why competition is not much of a
factor in setting fees. The directors are more aware of their re-
sponsibilities, but they are likewise at a disadvantage even if they are
more effective than Abe Pomerantz gave them credit for being, because
they really have no alternative. They can't kick out the management
in a dispute over fees. The stockholders would throw them out if
they did. So here is a situation of fiduciary responsibility in which
there is no effective means of enforcement.
I would view the various factors that were enumerated in the
report, and in the Wharton School Study as guidelines for determining
whether or not the standard of fiduciary conduct is or is not being
observed. If it isn't, the courts, under the Commission's proposal,
can perform one of their traditional responsibilities-to enforce this
standard.
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But the Commission doesn't intend to get into rate regulation.
All it will have to do is to determine, if Mr. Pomerantz doesn't
arrive ahead of it, whether or not there is a situation which it
should call to the attention of the courts. We think that, in view of
the absence of other controls, the fact that there is a conflict of
interest here, and that for various reasons the standard of fiduciary
duty may not be fully or correctly applied, the Commission's recom-
mendation provides a conservative means of dealing with excessive
management fees in accordance with traditional procedures.
We are not going to become a rate-making body. Nobody is.
We are not going to set rates with precision. They will continue to
vary. We will give great weight to fairly exercised management
judgment. And we will not focus on small things, and say fees
should be .47 instead of .48; but we will provide a backstop which
I think is needed.
I think that the bank common trust fund situation is, frankly, a
red herring. Bank common trust funds do not appeal, nor are they
intended to appeal, to small investors. They don't want the small
investor (as I found when I was in private practice, and dealing with
some family matters); they don't even want what I would regard as
a pretty good size investor.
They tell you they have a different responsibility. The charges
they make cover not only the administration of the common trust
fund, but the assumption by them of a trustee's responsibility and a
trustee's liability for handling an individual trust which is given to
them and is placed by them in their common trust fund. They have
to make sure that they are discharging their duties as trustee for
the individual, as well as manager for the common trust; these are
two different things.
I agree with Joe Welch that the directors and everybody else
should give a great deal of weight to performance and to the question
of whether the manager is performing the obligation he assumes.
I don't think, as I have mentioned, that the fact that the individual
investor can't operate his own mutual fund all by himself with $2,000
has any relevance whatsoever, but I do feel that the Commission has
devised a conservative and flexible device to meet a problem that
sometimes arises, and which must necessarily be met for the protection
of investors.
PROFESSOR MUNDIIEIM: Alfred?
The Investment Adviser as Fiduciary
MR. ALFRED JARETZKI, JR.: The last thing in the world I want
to do is to discuss law. I'm not really competent to do it, but when
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Phil Loomis keeps talking about the investment adviser being a
fiduciary, I must ask him to be more precise.
The adviser to Wellington Fund, for example, is a fiduciary in
so far as he manages the accounts of the stockholders, but he is not
a fiduciary as far as his fee is concerned. There he contracts with the
stockholders, and the stockholders are represented by the independent
directors.
Now I agree that there is a question whether the stockholders
are adequately represented by the independent directors, but that
isn't the point. I insist that the adviser is not a fiduciary as to his
charges to the investors.
The real issue here is whether the fees at present are reasonable,
and I think with some justice it could be said that some of the fees
are not reasonable. But the further question is: is it necessary or
desirable to have the SEC interfere with those fees by litigation? Even
where the fees are too high, I question the need to give such authority
to the SEC.
Fees are coming down. I think that experience has shown that
while Phil Loomis, the present General Counsel, would be very fair
and reasonable; in general, investment company managers would find
the members of the SEC staff in their hair from morning until night.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Allan?
The Power of the Unaffiliated Director
MR. CONWILL: I have been sitting here listening to Phil Loomis
say at least three times that the Commission is not interested in rate
regulation. I heard Frank Wheat give us that assurance this morning.
I suppose I should take some comfort from those statements; but I
don't, because it seems to me that this so-called reasonableness test,
as it is described in the report, involves, if not direct rate regulation,
something very much akin to it.
And when I heard Frank this morning say that this is an area
in which arm's length bargaining simply isr't possible, and when I
heard Phil make equivalent statements this afternoon, I get very
uneasy about a future in which I can foresee that the Commission's
judgment, in what to me is a business judgment area, is going to be
substituted for what I properly consider the role of the board of
directors, and particularly the unaffiliated directors.
Now, the Commission representatives and Abe Pomerantz have
made it perfectly plain that they think that the unaffiliated directors
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are, in essence, powerless. I don't believe that for one minute, and I
would be remiss if I did not observe that the report does absolutely
nothing to strengthen the position of unaffiliated directors. Indeed, it
introduces a curious anomaly, because the recommendation is that
once the fee arrangement is challenged in a court, the fact that the
unaffiliated directors approved the management contract will not be
considered relevant.'
Now, up to the time that I read the report, as an unaffiliated
director, I thought I was a rather important man, because it seemed
to me that when the statute required a majority of the unaffiliated
directors to approve the management contract, it contemplated a
significant act on the part of the unaffiliated director. But in reading
the recommendation in the report, I find it's not so at all. In sub-
stance, when the matter gets to court, the unaffiliated director becomes
the man who never was.
It seems to me that in talking about reasonableness, we are asking:
is the management fee too high? And in determining that, a funda-
mental consideration to me is: what value do you get for your payment
of the management fee? I think there is far too much emphasis on
one-half of one per cent, or 8 of 1 per cent, or whatever it might
be. To me one-half of one per cent can be much too high. It also
can be much too low.
For example, I have voted affirmatively to authorize a manage-
ment fee which realistically amounts to more than one-half of one
per cent, and I find on the basis of the closing figures yesterday that
in a period of little over four years the per share asset value of that
fund increased by 92 per cent. I'm glad I voted to authorize that
management fee, because I think the stockholders got a bargain.
The Argument Against Commission Intrusion,
I think Alfred Jaretzki really puts his finger on it when he says
the basic question is whether there is a need for Commission intrusion.
We all have opinions as to what might be too high, but the issue is:
is the Commission in any better position to evaluate that than we?
If the recommendation in the report is adopted, the SEC will
be in a much better position than we to make themselves heard on the
subject, because the recommendation also authorizes them to go into
court and make their views known to the court, which is not per-
mitted to consider the fact that unaffiliated directors approved the
arrangement. It also empowers them to adopt rules with respect to
the factors which should be considered in determining reasonableness.
23 SEC Mutwal Fund Report 144.
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Perhaps management fees in some instances are too high, but are
they high enough to justify Commission intrusion? I believe it is a
business judgment area, and I suppose, Bob, what in essence I am
saying is that on the basis of what I have seen thus far in the report-
and much as is my affection and admiration for the Commission and
its staff-I am unwilling to have their business judgment super-
imposed upon mine and the business judgment of my director
colleagues.
Standards to Guide the Unaffiliated Director
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Allan, your emphasis on the role of the
unaffiliated director brings us to the question: What's a director sup-
posed to do? How is he supposed to function? What standards is
he to have in mind when it is time to negotiate management fees or
advisory contracts?
Let me put a specific case. Suppose that an unaffiliated director
of a very large externally managed fund says to himself: we can hire
our own organization comparable to the one which serves us. Indeed,
on a salary basis we can pay even more than the advisory company
presently pays the investment research analysts and top management.
In that way we can get pretty much the same advice and the same
kinds of services, but for less. We don't have to worry about the
stockholders of the adviser who may have bought their shares at a
high price and now want a commensurate return.
Such a case might present itself because the unaffiliated directors
presumably are aware of some of the larger internally managed funds,
which have much lower expense ratios than most of the externally
managed funds.
How do you answer that director? What are the standards that
permit such a director to justify to himself that internalization is not
the answer he must reach? Alfred?
THE SHELL THEORY
MR. JARETZKI: The Investment Company Act recognizes and
permits the organization of the externally managed fund, and such a
fund has been organized and the stock has been sold to the public
on that basis. I don't think that that's a question for the directors.
That's the way it was sold, and even assuming that with a $1 billion
or $2 billion fund you could get cheaper internal organization, that
isn't what the stockholders bought, and I don't see that there is any
requirement on the directors to consider changing the set up.
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PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Morgan, do you want to talk to that?
Morgan Shipman is a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, and
has done some work in connection with this report.
PROFESSOR MORGAN SHIPMAN: Yes. First, I should exlicitly
disclose that I am a consultant to the Commission on the report, and
the other part of the Commission disclaimer must follow. I am, of
course, more removed from the report than the Commission people;
what they said certainly applies in my case: the views I express here
are nothing more than my own individual views.
I disagree. It seems that Mr. Jaretzki is espousing the shell
theory-that an arrangement has been sold to the investing public
over the years, and that the directors, unaffiliated or otherwise, have
no right to terminate that arrangement. The Investment Company
Act specifically rejects the shell theory." This lies at the heart of
the management fee dispute. The Investment Company Act looks
at the investment company as a separate legal entity, and the directors
of the investment company have clear continuing fiduciary duties to
the fund and its shareholders. This applies to the affiliated and the
unaffiliated directors. Justice Cardozo made it clear almost fifty years
ago in the Globe Woolen' case that the director involved in the
conflict of interest has the affirmative duty to step forward and ensure
that the transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
All directors have the fiduciary duty to examine the situation and
to ascertain what is the best long-term continuing arrangement to
make. If the adviser has done well over a period of years, this is
something to be considered. Also to be considered are any losses
the adviser may have suffered in early years when the fund was
being built up.
So I think the first thing to do is to bury the shell theory.
MR. JARETZKI: I don't subscribe to the shell theory.
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: I'm sorry. I thought I heard overtones of
it. You see, I strongly oppose the shell theory. Its adoption would
weaken the concepts of fiduciary duty and impede progress.
From that point, then, I think the directors should also discard
the idea that we look at the value of the service on a shareholder-by-
shareholder basis. We hear a lot of language today to the effect that:
really, it would be a bargain to shareholders at many times the price;
that they have been making a lot of money out of their investment in
mutual funds-and this has been true during the past fifteen years.
24 Investment Company Act § 15(a), (c), 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15
(a), (c) (1964).
25Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 43, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
THE MANAGEMENT FEE
MR. JARETZKI: I agree with you entirely.
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: And I am in substantial agreement with
the excellent articles that you have written over the years in this area."
The Power of the Directors to Internalize Management
PROFESSOR HERMAN: If Mr. Jaretzki is correct that the Act
does not contemplate that the board of directors will get rid of a
management group, then, of course, their power over the management
fee is thus made null and void, because they no longer have an
ultimate sanction. If they cannot replace the management, then I
think that a very serious crimp has been put in their capacity to
negotiate a management fee.
MR. JARETZKI: I didn't say that they could not replace a
management.
PROFESSOR HERMAN: What did you say?
MR. JARETZKI: I said that the 1940 Act contemplated an invest-
ment company structure with external management, and therefore I
did not think it was a question for the directors to decide, whether or
not they wanted an external management.
PROFESSOR HERMAN: I thought you were saying that it wasn't
for them to decide whether the management should be replaced.
MR. JARETZKI: Oh, no. I did not say that, and I did not mean
that.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Well, you are not saying, are you,
Alfred, that the directors can't decide that they would like an internal
management? Or are you?
MR. JARETZKI: Well, I haven't gone that far. I wouldn't go
quite that far, but I would say that internalization would be a very
radical step under the circumstances.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Bob?
MR. LOEFFLER: Well, I was going to address myself in part to
that, although as has been said, I think the possibility of internalization
is a form of the competition with which a manager of capital is con-
stantly confronted.
2 6 Jaretzki, Duties & Respowsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAW &
CONTMp. PROB. 777 (1964); Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act: Problems
Relating to Investment Advisory Contracts, 45 VA. L. REv. 1023 (1959) ; Jaretzld,
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WAsir. U.L.Q. 303 (1941).
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Certainly, the unaffiliated directors of a fund in determining upon
that course of action would entail a grave responsibility, because,
basically, the shareholders have bought the management of the manage-
ment company. If the unaffiliated directors undertake the responsi-
bility of discharging the management company and running the fund
themselves, they had better be successful.
But certainly they have that alternative available to them, and
it's one form of the constant competition that is present, and it's not
necessarily always an unarticulated one. These possibilities and
alternatives do exist, and that, I believe, is a part of the reason why
the management fees are coming down today.
The Investment Adviser's Relationship to the Fund's Shareholders
But I would like, while I have a captive audience, to get back to
a difference that I have with the view that was expressed previously
by Phil Loomis. When Phil suggested that the management company
has a direct fiduciary relationship to the fund's shareholders-who in
effect are our customers-and that a management company's charges
therefore must be reasonable, and that there is no arm's length bargain-
ing with the shareholders, he equates the relationship, in a sense, to
that of trustee and beneficiary. I think that he is legally wrong, and
I think this is an important matter of substance.
To begin, the management company is engaged in a business,
the business of managing funds; and it is a business. The manage-
ment company does engage in negotiations-arm's length negotia-
tions-with the unaffiliated directors of the funds, who are in that sense
like union negotiators.
To say that the management company is in a position of a trustee
for a beneficiary, with no arm's length negotiation with the repre-
sentatives of the individual shareholder, is to pretend that the un-
affiliated directors are not there at all.
I think that the Commission when it takes this approach is in an
ambivalent position. It appears not to be able to make up its mind.
The structure of the 1940 Act is there. We observe it. The present
report endorses it; and yet the Commission tries to pretend it's not
there, as though it can't make up its mind whether it relies on the
1940 Act structure or it does not.
I assumed this report endorsed the existing structure. Under
this structure, the fund directors negotiate with the management
company, which is engaged in the business of managing the funds,
with respect to the price that will be paid to them for the services they
are rendering.
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Governmental Regulation of Profit
Going one step further, because this is perhaps the sum and
substance of it all, there is a question of principle that comes into play,
whether this area is an appropriate place for the introduction into our
economic system of the principle of profit regulation.
All that seems to be said, really, is: well, maybe the profits are
too much. Maybe they are not; but maybe in some areas they are too
much, or for some funds the profits are too much for the services being
rendered. So we should undertake to regulate some of those profits.
Nowhere that I know of to date in our economic system have we
ever introduced the concept of profit regulation in a nonutility industry
which is neither a protected industry, nor exempt from the anti-
trust laws.
One example of the latter, I think the classic example, is the
New York Stock Exchange minimum commission. Brokers are all
permitted to get together and agree on a minimum price that they
all will charge. Management companies cannot do that. Mutual
fund management companies are not exempt from the anti-trust law.
They are not a protected industry. They are not a utility, and I
don't think they should be thought of as a utility because they are not.
It's only in those areas that you have profit regulation.
Now we have, I think for the first time, the suggestion of intro-
ducing profit regulation into our economic system on the principle
that maybe somebody thinks the rates are too high. What's the harm
in someone having the power to say that they should be reasonable?
The question is whether you rely upon the normal forces of our
economic system as it exists today, or whether you are going to sub-
stitute some regulatory process. At the moment I'm not even going
to undertake to say whether we should introduce this concept of profit
regulation into our economic system, whether it's good or bad, but I
think the proponent of it has the burden of really studying the conse-
quences that flow from its introduction, and I have seen no evidence
of such a study having been made. It's just thrown out on a "well,
why not?" basis.
I think the import of this is far-reaching. If profit regulation
is appropriate in the business of fund management, why is it not
appropriate for the manufacturers of automobiles, for the retail drug-
gists, for any other area where the public has the same interest, in
the sense of being able to receive a service or a commodity at a reason-
able price?
I think this is the import of this novel concept, and that there
has been no study of its consequences.
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MR. CONWILL: May I only add briefly to that, Bob?
The proponents not only have the burden of proof here, but
I again revert to the idea that this is an opinion area. So far as
I am aware, legislation is really justified when there has been a
demonstrated abuse-not opinion-and I don't see anything in this
report that documents any kind of abuse, other than opinions that
something may be in some instances too high.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I saw a head shaking.
MR. POMERANTZ: Many things have been thrown up these last
few minutes, beginning with the rather startling declaration that invest-
ment advisers are not fiduciaries, enunciated by Jaretzki, J., and a straw
man attack on regulation-profit regulation-which I didn't find in the
SEC report. If it's there, I have missed it.
I think we ought to get down to the SEC report, which we are
here to talk about.
I think maybe it would be a good idea if the SEC had come out
with profit regulation and said: No more than one-half of 1 per cent
for the first $100 million, and three-eighths for the next $500 million,
and so on, establishing a standard of ceiling values, which, I might
say, would have a good deal of precedent in our society; but I won't
elaborate that theme now.
But that's not what the SEC says. It merely wants to balance
the game. It merely wants to unload the dice. It merely wants to
say to the courts: consider the question of fairness of fees as a matter
of "fairness", whatever that very elastic word may mean. But,
assuming it has meaning, give to the courts the power to say what
is fair and what is not fair.
And in that direction what Bob Loeffler calls regulation is not
regulation at all. That is a perversion of words. It's merely saying:
let's play the game fairly.
For example, let the SEC come in and bring a lawsuit-and I
welcome them as a professional competitor, I might add. Don't permit
the use of shareholder ratification to hobble the courts.
Bob, I don't see this bogeyman of profit regulation which you
conjure up. I see only the SEC's effort to be the man in the middle,
to try to work out some kind of a balance which gives to the courts
the right to make an objective evaluation of what is fair.
Fiduciary Duties of Directoi's
Now, let me turn to Jaretzki's statement that there is no fiduciary
duty resting on directors to make sure that fees are reasonable.
THE MANAGEMENT FEE
MR. JARETZKI: No. I said that an investment adviser was not in
a fiduciary capacity as to the amount of his fee, not that it has no
fiduciary duty. It has a fiduciary duty not to charge excessive fees.
THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNAFFILIATED DIRECTOR
MR. POMERANTZ: That dichotomy escapes me. Let me get back
to Loeffiler. Loeffiler says the cordon sanitaire between the shareholder
and the adviser is the unaffiliated director.
MR. LOEFFLER: On the issue of the fee.
MR. POMERANTZ: I have had fourteen investment company cases
and fourteen sets of depositions and/or cross-examinations of the
independent directors, and in not one single case did any unaffiliated
director ever respond "Yes" to this type of question: When your
fund grew from $100 million to $600 million, did you ever give any
thought to making a comparison between your half of one per cent
fees and somebody else's fees?
No.
Did you ever give any thought to an internal management, a la
MIT?
No.
Did you ever once suggest that when the fund got to be over a
billion dollars-in one or two of the cases I had-perhaps a reduction
from one-half per cent to seven-sixteenths of one per cent, or any
other minute fraction?
Answer: No-and I mean the uniform answer.
The answer is that the realities are, as the SEC's report well
recognizes, that you can't count on the unaffiliated director. There's
no point in condemning him and using harsh epithets. The fact is
that in real life the unaffiliated director never has initiated a movement
for a reduction of fees.
I don't want to overstate the argument. There have been times
when fees have been reduced, but that's in spite of the unaffiliated
directors. That's when, because of conditions, perhaps, of competition,
or what have you, the management-the adviser-has determined that
it would be good business to reduce the fee. That's not happened very
often, but it has sporadically.
I have one case now-I will not name it-where the adviser also
gets one-half of one per cent, and the fund has over a billion dollars in
assets. The adviser also gets brokerage commissions-I'll soon be
naming it, won't I?--of over $1 million a year, and keeps them; gets
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a load of the usual 82 per cent, and its net income before taxes on
all those sources is $11Y2 million a year.
Now, wouldn't you imagine, speaking of Bob Loeffler's hypo-
thetical unaffiliated director, that somewhere along the way some fellow
would raise his little hand and meekly suggest that in the light of
the vast growth of the fund and the accompanying fact that expenses
don't go up proportionately with the rise in the assets of the fund-
that some little, meek voice would suggest that maybe there ought to
be a consideration-just, please, a reconsideration whether those fees
ought to be reduced?
When I was a boy, that's how I was taught that the fiduciary
obligation goes, and what it means.
There has been frequent suggestion that directors can't change an
external adviser, because that's not the package which was bought.
Of course, they can! And if there's any doubt about whether they
should, they can always go to the shareholders and recommend it,
and you know very well what would happen if the board of directors
said: Gentlemen, we think we can give you the same type of advice for
$5 million less a year, or $4 million less a year. I'm not a betting
man, but I will give 2 to 1 that the shareholders would sign the
proxies, and would be very happy to accept a new deal which is going
to save them all that money.
So I think it's just a lot of rationalizing to say that, having
gone into a mould, that that mould is so rigid that in the exercise
of fiduciary responsibility the directors, affiliated or unaffiliated, can't
reasonably consider and recommend a change.
I'd like to ask the rhetorical question: Who is there to protect the
public, if the unaffiliated director cannot? Is it not the SEC in which
is lodged the responsibility to try to assure some measure of
reasonableness ?
Much as I enjoy this business-and I'm not for a moment be-
moaning it or claiming that I'm tired of it. I love it. I hope it keeps
on another forty years. But taking a social view of the problem, the
fortuitousness of finding a gambling lawyer-one who is ready to risk
years of his time in the pursuit of this kind of suit where the penalty
of failure is a great, great loss of time and money, although, true, the
rewards of success are munificent-suggests that, with all due deference
to the charming little references to my triggering, this is not the real
solution to this very big problem.
MR. CONwILL: Abe, I'm delighted that, with your usual candor,
you have confessed that you enjoyed this work. I would add that
with this new reasonability test you are going to enjoy it all the more.
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Considerations in Deciding to Change Management
MR. WELCH: I want to get back to your question as to what a
board of directors should do in deciding whether or not they should
change an external management for an internal management, or to
hire somebody else. I think the directors, if the manager has been
doing a competent job, would be hard put to make a decision to
change just because of a matter of cost. For example, if the people
they hire do a less than competent job, it's going to cost the fund
infinitely more than the difference in managing fees.
These directors quite often are with you for years. They change
from time to time, but they live with the manager, and they know
his competence, and they also realize that the manager, as Morgan
has said earlier, for a good many years didn't make any money at all.
Take our case. We formed Wellington Fund in 1929, which was
a marvelous bit of timing. Eleven years later in 1940, we had grown
to the enormous sum of $5 million, and naturally we made no money.
We lost money all through there. In another five years we were up
to $15 million, and we didn't make any money. We lost money.
It wasn't until we began to get some real volume in the late 1940's
and the '50's that the management effort became profitable.
Don't you think-don't all of you think-that the directors must
give consideration to this long period of famine? And this isn't only
true of our fund. Many had a hard time getting started. Isn't it
fair that the management get the rewards of the many, many years of
pioneering work in building the fund? And should it be considered
an unreasonable fee when he begins to start to make some money.
The Spectre of Rate Regulation
My real problem is: Who is going to be able to decide any better
than the independent directors what a reasonable fee is? I think they
are in the best position to judge, based on what the manager earns
and what they expect him to earn in the future. I'm worried about
regulation. Although it may be argued that this isn't really rate
regulation, I certainly think that it approaches it.
It seems to me that this is a job for the independent directors,
and I do believe that in most cases-there may be some exceptions-
the independent directors are doing that job.
MR. JARETzxI: The Commission is seeking rate regulation by
the threat of litigation.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Phil, apparently you have not yet been
successful in persuading the panel that we aren't in an area of rate
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regulation. Perhaps you can address yourself to that point. In addi-
tion could you comment on the point Joe Welch raised? In the
Commission's standard of reasonableness, what weight may the di-
rector, or what weight would the Commission, give to entrepreneurial
risk? Intrusion of that factor makes the standard of reasonableness
very elusive. On the other hand, without some kind of guidance, the
new test of reasonableness may not be much of an advance on the
standards used by the courts today.
MR. LoomIs: The report says that the contribution made and
the losses incurred in getting a fund going should be considered in
determining whether or not the fee is reasonableY As Bob says, that
is not the easiest thing in the world to do, and I don't believe there
is any mathematical formula for it, but I think it is possible for the
directors and for a court of equity to consider that matter and to
give it weight-and considerable weight-but at the same time, that
does not, I think, justify an unlimited right to exact fees over an
extended period.
The Fiduciary Duty of the Unaffiliated Director
Now, it seems to me also that I have been misunderstood when I
mentioned fiduciary relations. It may be, if you adopt a version of
the shell theory, that you can say that the investment adviser as a
legal entity doesn't have a fiduciary responsibility to the stockholders
of the fund with respect to the fee. But I agree with Mr. Pomerantz
that that is somewhat unrealistic. There is a slight inconsistency here.
It has been pointed out that the independent directors shouldn't,
except under most extraordinary circumstances, get rid of the invest-
ment adviser, or internalize. This means-and this is, I believe, a
fact of life in this industry-that the investment adviser is in effective
control over the fund, and this is the way it is intended to be, in order
that the stockholders can have the benefit of his advice. If he is in
effective control of a legal entity, I think he owes a fiduciary duty to
it in all aspects of that relationship.
Furthermore, the affiliated directors are directors of the fund.
They owe a fiduciary duty to the fund, and I think that where they
have, as Mr. Loeffler points out, a conflicting fiduciary duty to, say,
the public stockholders of the adviser, they shouldn't neglect that duty
either; but the existence of those conflicting fiduciary duties may give
rise to a justification for the intervention of a court of equity, if they
prefer the one master over the other.
27 See SEC Mutual Fund Report 145.
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I think, therefore, that Mr. Loeffler's statement that the investment
adviser is a separate business which has nothing more to do with,
and no more responsibility to the stockholders than the printer does,
misconceives the situation.
MR. LOEFFLER: That is an overstatement of my statement.
MR. LoomIs: Well, I know. It is a slight overstatement, but I
think that's where your last analysis logically leads.
Consequently, I do feel that there is a fiduciary responsibility here,
and that you do have men serving two masters, and therefore, there
is a basis for the courts to apply fiduciary principles.
Potential Liability for Unaffiliated Directors
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: One question came up from the floor
which seems very relevant at this point.
"Won't the standard of reasonableness impose such a burden of
potential liability on independent directors that it will be difficult to
get qualified men to act as such ?" In other words, the question says:
in saying that the standard of reasonableness ought to be applied, why
is it necessary to impose liability, or suggest liability be imposed on
unaffiliated directors, who, the report itself suggests, don't have a great
deal of power?
MR. LoomIs: I think the report endeavored to make it clear that
independent directors would not have any personal liability, even if
a court should determine that the fee was unreasonable. Certainly,
if that's not clear, it should be. We don't intend that they should be
subjected to financial responsibility for their acts, even if they are not
able, or as Mr. Pomerantz has suggested, are unwilling to deal with
the problem. I just don't think they should or will have any personal
financial liability.
Effective Power of the Independent Director
With respect to the independent directors it seems to me un-
realistic to say that the independent directors set the fee. They don't,
and they can't. What they do is consider the fee proposed by the
investment adviser, and analyze it to see whether they think it's
reasonable. If they don't think it's reasonable, what can they do
about it? They just have the power to say: Well, we think you are
charging too much. And the adviser says: I don't think I am. I'm
in a separate business-and there they are.
They are not in a position to say: All right, Adviser, if you don't
come down, we're going to throw you out, because this is an extraor-
dinarily drastic step which they can't and don't take in a disagreement
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as to the fee. Therefore I think it's just plain wrong to say that the fee
is fixed by the independent directors. It's fixed by the adviser, subject
to the approval of the independent directors, who should and, hope-
fully, in most cases, do what they can about the situation.
PROFESSOR MUNDrEIM: Bob, you wanted a minute.
MR. LOEFFLER: Well, I wanted to clarify one thing with respect
to the fiduciary duty concept that we were discussing. The fiduciary
obligation with respect to the management company's fees-and I'm
speaking in a technical legal sense--goes from the unaffiliated directors
of the fund to the fund's shareholders-that is the line of the fiduciary
obligation. Certainly there is a fiduciary duty-I don't know whether
there is in a technical legal sense--in all other respects of the manage-
ment of the fund.
Every management company feels a heavy responsibility for the
welfare of the fund's shareholders, or to its customers, and certainly
in today's business climate I think that's true of almost every enter-
prise with respect to the customers for its products.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: You are suggesting that the affiliated
directors don't have an equal fiduciary duty on fees to the fund's
shareholders ?
MR. LOEFFLER: They don't vote.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: They have no participation?
MR. LOEFFLER: They do not vote.
MR. JARETZKI: I don't think they have an equal responsibility,
because, as you say, they don't vote; but they do have a responsibility
not to charge exorbitant fees.
MR. POMERANTZ: Well, actually they do vote, but what you
mean is that the vote of the majority of the unaffiliated is necessary.
MR. LOEFFLER: As a practical matter their votes do not count.28
28 The Investment Company Act § 15(c), 54 Stat. 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80
(a)-15(c) (1964) provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any registered investment company having a board
of directors to enter into, renew, or perform any contract or agreement,
written or oral . . . unless the terms of such contract or agreement and any
renewal thereof have been approved (1) by a majority of the directors who
are not parties to such contract or agreement or affiliated persons of any such
party ....
Section 15(a), 54 Stat 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80(a)-15(a) (1964) provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to serve or act as investment adviser
of a registered investment company, except pursuant to a written contract,
which contract . . . shall continue in effect for a period more than two
years from the date of its execution, only so long as such continuance is
specifically approved at least annually by the board of directors or by vote
of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of such company . ...
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MR. POMERANTZ: At any rate, they have a fiduciary duty as
directors not to waste corporate assets.
MR. CONWILL: Before we abandon the point I just want to
object very strenuously to the concept that the unaffiliated director has
no power. He has a lot of power if he chooses to act-and many
times he does.
I think when Phil says that they don't have any power and it's im-
possible for them to act, he is basing that conclusion on the idea that
so often management fees have not been reduced, and on the assump-
tion that the management fees should be reduced. With respect to the
funds on whose board I serve, I don't believe they should.
MR. POMERANTZ: What is the duty of the unaffiliated director,
if not to supervise the fairness of the renewal of fees? Otherwise you
are completely sterilizing him.
MR. CoNwlLL: All right, Abe. Certainly they have that duty
if the adviser is not performing well, but-
MR. POMERANTZ: No. I'm not now raising the question, Allan,
whether or not in a given context fees should or should not be reduced.
I'm debating with you the question of whether there is a continuing
fiduciary duty on the unaffiliated directors to see to it that the fees
never get so large as to constitute, again, that vague conception of
law, a waste of corporate assets.
MR. CONWiLL: Certainly there is a continuing duty of the
unaffiliated directors to see that the fees do not get so large as to
constitute a waste. There is a continuing duty for him to see that
the stockholder has been treated fairly; but the fact that the fee has
not been reduced does not at all suggest waste, and it does not at all
suggest that the stockholders are not being treated fairly.
MR. LoomIs: May I mention one thing, because it has been
repeatedly stated that I have said that the independent director has
no power. That is not what I mean. He has a certain amount of
power. He can endeavor to persuade, to convince, whenever he
feels the need to do so.
On the other hand, I do say that he is not almighty. He
doesn't have all power. He only has some power. He is probably
reluctant to exercise that in a vigorous way, because, after all, it's un-
pleasant to tell the people that he has worked with for years and likes
and respects-and probably that's the only reason that he's on the
board; he wouldn't accept the job if he didn't like and respect them-
that they are charging too much.
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Nevertheless, if he feels so, he has some power, but in the last
analysis his powers are limited, and his opportunities and perhaps
his willingness to exercise them in a vigorous way may be even more
limited; and, therefore, there is need for an additional check. But
there is by no means any desire for price or profit regulation.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNREASONABLENESS AND WASTE
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Let me just try here to sharpen up one
issue.
I sense agreement that all directors have a duty to see that no
fee is charged which constitutes waste. I take it the Commission's
position is that the director's duty is to see that no fee is charged
which isn't reasonable-and if the duty is performed inadequately, then
the court ought to be able to review it at the initiation of the Com-
mission. What I would like to know-I have never been able to dis-
cover this answer in the course of discussions with my corporation
law classes-is: What's the difference between an unreasonable fee
and a wasteful fee? Can I get some help from Harvard Law School?
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: You can try.
First, a preliminary comment. Several times today it has been
stated that the Commission has a horrendous burden in bringing this
conflict of interest regulation into the Investment Company Act; that
it's something quite foreign to that Act. It's not foreign at all. If
one turns to Section 17, one sees that transactions between advisers
and other affiliated persons and funds with respect to property are
regulated, and that such transactions are not just subject to challenge
in court: One must go to the Commission and obtain a determination
that the terms are reasonable and fair and do not involve over-reaching
on the part of any person concerned.
Your question ties in with Section 17. I think reasonable means
that you construct a model of what the price would be in a purely
arm's length dealing. Waste is, I think, on the other hand, some-
thing that might best be called grossly unreasonable. The Investment
Company Act makes distinctions like this several places by using the
adjective "gross" in front of certain terms. 9
So, like all great legal debates, it's a matter of degree, as I have
always looked at it, and something that is "waste"-especially the
way the Delaware courts apply that test ° '-is something that is
grossly unreasonable.
29 See Investment Company Act § 36, 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) -36
(1964) which uses the term four times.
3o See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962).
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PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: How great is the distance between un-
reasonable and waste? How far has the Commission moved? Maybe
the man to answer that is Mr. Pomerantz, since he's the man who
normally has to meet the burden of proving waste under the present
law, and who, if the Commission's recommendations are adopted, would
merely have to meet a standard of reasonableness.
Will the recommendation make your job easier?
MR. POMERANTZ: At the expense of sounding as if I am anti-
semantic, let me dissent from my learned brother from Cambridge.
It ain't all that complicated. It's this simple.
If a corporation can buy a locomotive for $10,000, and the direc-
tors authorize the payment of $10,001, a fortiori where they are the
sellers, that is (a) unreasonable, (b) waste, (c) actionable and (d) the
directors ought to be condemned for it. There is no such semantic
separation.
A director's duty in simple words-and we lawyers have a habit
of making words very unsimple-is to see to it that the shareholder
gets a fair shake, gets a fair deal; and whether what you are buying,
Bob, is advisory service or locomotives or safety pins, it is the director's
duty to get the best deal he can for his shareholders.
Now, at this point, enter the devil. If it's an arm's length trade
with Baldwin Locomotive, or some arm's length advisory organization,
like Ebasco, then, sitting as a judge now, I would be disposed to take
a very tolerant, patient and forgiving view of the stupidity or incom-
petence of a director in paying too much. When I say "I," I mean
every judge on the American bench, because my experience teaches
me that judges are not punitive, and so many times we have seen
situations where the judge shakes his head and says: Oh no! That
was pretty dumb! But he won't impose a liability for that, because
he's a human being.
Now consider the situation where the recipient of self-conferred
largesse is the fiduciary. Then it is not only common sense but it is
common law that the court must put the microscope to that deal, and
put the burden-not only the burden of going forward, but the burden
of proof-on the fiduciary to justify that transaction. Note the wholly
different pragmatic approach of the courts to the recognition of the
fact that when you are dealing at arm's length, the court will give
you a great latitude of forgiveness; if you are dealing where self-interest
is put in conflict with your fiduciary duty, then the courts will wag
their finger at you and apply a stern rule. 1
And it's as simple as that. It's simple, and yet complex, because,
of course, the issue of what's fair is what tantalizes a court, and that's
8 1 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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one of the reasons why, at the expense of starting off a whole new
balloon, which I hope it doesn't do, if I were writing the SEC report,
I would tend to relieve the courts of this very difficult burden-courts
are not equipped to determine these commercial questions of fairness
-and give it to an agency like the SEC, to establish the guidelines.
The Argument That the Commission Proposal Constitutes Rate
Regulation
MR. LOEFFLER: I have had arguments with several of my col-
leagues about the meaning of the term "waste," and the difference
between "waste" and "reasonableness." This goes to the question
as to whether this is or is not profit regulation. Reference was made
by Morgan to Section 17 of the Investment Company Act, where the
Commission already has jurisdiction to determine matters in a self-
dealing situation. When you go into a court in a self-dealing situation,
you don't have a waste problem at all. What we are talking about
here is a situation where you have independent, unaffiliated directors,
not engaged in a self-dealing transaction, exercising their judgment
in good faith by entering into a contract which they believe is reason-
able. Now under the proposal, when you go into court, you disregard
the director's actions. The court is directed-not merely authorized-
under the recommendation, as I read it, to substitute its business judg-
ment for that which has been made in good faith by non-self-interested
directors.
To me this is a novelty in the law and in our economic system.
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to substitute their judg-
ment for the business judgment of directors of a corporation, absent
fraud, self-dealing or something which invalidates the director's judg-
ment or the contract.
The present recommendation directs the judge, or the Commis-
sion, (whichever it may be) in effect, to take over a function which
has heretofore been performed in our economic system by directors
of corporations.
I think that when a proposal such as this has been made, there
is a heavy burden on somebody to say: We have made a study of
what the portents and consequences may be. And I don't think that
has been done here.
The Argument That the Commission Proposal Does Not Constitute
Rate Regulation
MR. Loomis: May I say a little about that?-because this il-
lustrates one of the more difficult phases of what the Commission
is proposing.
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It has been suggested that we are proposing that the courts
completely disregard the judgments of the unaffiliated directors when
they are arrived at in good faith. I don't think we are doing anything
of the sort. As Abe Pomerantz has said, this is a self-dealing trans-
action, normally, because the affiliated directors are interested on both
sides of it. The adviser is interested on both sides of it.
Normally, as Abe has said, this would mean that the courts would
examine this through a microscope, and the party to that contract-
the adviser-would have the burden of justifying it. But the Com-
mission has not said that, because we recognize that the unaffiliated
directors are there, and that they have a responsibility, that they are
presumed to have discharged it to the best of their abilities.
Consequently the Commission, or Abe Pomerantz, attacking a
fee under our proposal, will have the burden of proof. The fact that
the unaffiliated directors have had an opportunity to act will in effect
shift the burden of proof in what remains a self-dealing transaction;
but we recognize that the unaffiliated directors are a minority of the
board, that they are under certain handicaps, because they can't change
the adviser, and that they don't like to pick a fight with the adviser.
Consequently, we don't afford conclusive weight to the judgment of
the unaffiliated directors, because we know that they are not exclu-
sively in control of the transaction.
MR. JARETZRI: I think I owe it to Brother Loomis to say that
I do agree with him about the unaffiliated directors being somewhat
handicapped; but the question is whether that justifies taking the
problem into court or taking it to the SEC.
I think, by and large, things will work out. There are manage-
ment fees that are too high. There may be fewer such fees now than
there were before, and I think they will find their own level. I just
don't think the remedy suggested is necessary.
PERFORMANCE AND THE MANAGEMENT FEE
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I want to raise one other point, which
many questions from the floor raise. To what extent, in thinking about
the structure of the management fee or its size, should performance
be taken into account, and on what basis should performance be taken
into account ?
Allan, I know that at least one of the funds in which you are a
director uses a performance-related standard for measuring fees, so
I suppose you think a good deal of weight ought to be given to
that factor.
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The Argument for the Performance-Related Management Fee
MR. CONwILL: I think so. Indeed, given a free choice, I think
a performance-related management fee is a fairer fee than one-half of
one per cent, three-eighths of one per cent, or any other fixed per-
centage of the total assets, and I think performance should be given
very great weight indeed.
I can cite you one example in which I actively participated,
which to me reflects the power of unaffiliated directors, because the
performance was, in the minds of the unaffiliated directors, inadequate.
We didn't suggest that the management company have its contract
terminated, but, because of our suggestions, there were changes of
the investment personnel in the management company, and happily
they turned the performance around, so that now it has a very satis-
factory performance.
Now, what is the role of the unaffiliated director at that point?
Since that date the assets also have grown. There has been no reduc-
tion to take advantage of the so-called economies of size, although
they are there; but are the unaffiliated directors in that instance, once
the adviser has made changes in accordance with their wishes, and
once performance is highly satisfactory, to say: Now that you have done
what we wanted, we are going to reduce your management fee?
I think not.
The investor in a mutual fund should have a performance objec-
tive of some sort. That is, he may prefer to take the lesser risk of
a balanced fund, or he may want to take a flyer with the so-called
"hot" performing funds; but whatever the performance objective is,
the extent to which the fund measures up to that objective is a critical
factor in determining the amount of the fee. If the fund measures
up to that objective, I do not think it is mandatory to take advantage
of the economies of size.
PROFESSOR MUNDrEIM: Do you relate the amount of the fee
to a particular performance; for example, performing better than the
Dow Jones Average by one point increases your management fee by
10 per cent. How do you work that out? What time periods do
you look at? One year? Or moving averages over a period of years?
What penalties do you impose on somebody who performs less well,
for example, than the average of all funds?
MR. CONWILL: I have an active participation in several funds in
which the performance is measured, and the fee is measured, by a
fixed percentage of the amount of realized and unrealized apprecia-
tion of the fund, coupled with a one-year loss carryover, so that if
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the performance is very good, the adviser will earn far more than one-
half of one per cent; if the performance is poor, he will earn zero, and
he will also have to carry the loss for that year over to the following
year.
Also I have had participation in a management fee arrangement
whereby the fee is based on the degree by which the performance
exceeds a given average. I have been a little distressed to find in
the so-called technical recommendations by the Commission, some of
which are not technical at all, that at least some performance types
of compensation would be outlawed.'
The Argument Against a Performance-Related Management Fee
MR. JARETZKI: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to say that I think there
is a little difference of opinion here. I think that's a rather dangerous
method of compensation. I think it encourages speculation.
I can't say it's bad if people want that in a particular fund, but,
as you know, the vast majority of funds don't do it, and I think they
are sound in not doing it. I feel rather strongly about that.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Do you have a thought on that, Morgan?
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: I would tend to agree with Mr. Jaretzki.
MR. LoomiS: I think we would tend, or at least some of us, to
agree with Mr. Jaretzki, and that may be one reason for the suggestion
that Allan is worried about.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: From an economist's point of view,
doesn't Allan's suggestion that fees be related to performance, to
achievement of objectives, make a great deal of sense? And from an
economist's point of view, can you devise a system which perhaps will
allay some of the fears with respect to speculation which Alfred and
Phil and Morgan raise?
PROFESSOR HERMAN: Well, it really would be extremely difficult
for the independent director to arrive at a system of performance
measures that would be very meaningful. The variation in performance
by time periods and by type of fund is so complicated that I would
think this would really present immense difficulties. You could have
very drastic fluctuations in compensation that, really, I don't think
would be based on anything very sound.
I should mention that we actually made a study, as you know,
of the relation between performance and management fee rates over
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an extended period of time, and we found no correlation whatsoever
between the two.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: If Allan's system were adopted, there
would be one.
PROFESSOR HERMAN: Not necessarily. On the other hand, I
would agree that the fund directors theoretically ought to be giving
continuous weight, as Mr. Welch has emphasized, to performance;
that the management fee rates and the cost of doing business are
only one factor, and that performance is very important. It ought
to be given some weight as a going proposition.
Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever why the fee rate can't
be adjusted, or why, in fact, the independent directors couldn't decide
that the management had performed so badly that they ought to be
dispossessed and a new management put in-which I do not believe
has ever happened in the mutual fund business.
Measures of Perfornmnce
MR. CONWILL: Ed, you surprised me a little bit by suggesting
that the unaffiliated directors would have difficulty finding performance
measures, because the Wharton School Study itself drew many conclu-
sions relating to performance, and it didn't seem to have any difficulty
finding adequate performance measures.-
PROFESSOR HERMAN: The study certainly did not establish a
standard that any member of the industry accepted. Every member
of the industry was furious, and gave 400 alternative ways of measur-
ing performance.
MR. WELCH: I said earlier, as Ed has alluded to just now, that
one of the things that directors should give great weight to is how
well the fund has performed under the manager's guidance with respect
to its specific objectives.
Now, I think these are appropriate in a fund that has, perhaps,
a single objective, such as Bob Doran spoke of this morning, which
is much easier to measure than a fund with varied objectives. Bob's
fund has one objective, to achieve maximum capital growth. They
have a fee of half of one per cent, and if they fail to match the Dow
Average, they lose an eighth of one per cent, and if they better the
Dow Average by-I think it's two per cent-they get an extra
one-eighth of one per cent.
I wouldn't advocate that that type of fee arrangement be put on that
general type of mutual fund, but I do think that the performance of
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the fund in the light of its particular objectives is something that
directors should give great weight to when making a fee.
And when I said earlier, Phil, that I think the many years of
famine in the early years of funds would justify some profits in later
years, I didn't mean that there should be an unlimited compensation
for an unlimited number of years. As I said at the very beginning,
I think fees should be reasonable, and should be reduced in amount.
MR. LooMIs: I think we are in entire agreement on that.
The Question of Reducing the Fee for Poor Performance
MR. POMERANTZ: Joe, has there ever been a case in history when
a fund has reduced the fee because of bad performance?
MR. WELCH: I don't think that's the remedy, if the performance
is bad.
MR. POMERANTZ: Oh, you want to reward the good performance?
MR. WELCH: You've got to do something about getting better
performance, which is more important than the rate of the manage-
ment fee.
MR. POMERANTZ: Well, we all agree with that, but what's sauce
for the goose is-
PROFESSOR HERMAN: You get a new manager.
MR. POMERANTZ: Well, I would think, if you are going to have
a system of rewards, the connotation is that the system, to use a harsh
word, have punishments, or the opposite of rewards, whatever it is
-demerits.
There is a fund that's getting paid $5 million or $6 million a
year-and I could mention names, but I won't-and turns up over
a rather long period of time a rather miserable performance record.
In all fairness, the directors ought to give thought to lowering that
fee, because $5 million is a lot of dollars a year for advice which turns
out to be, however unluckily, bad advice.
MR. WELCH: Isn't it more important, Abe, that the directors
see to it that the manager hires some new people to improve the
performance, as I think Alfred said here earlier?
MR. POMERANTZ: Oh, I'm not against that. I think they should
hire new people, and they should lower their fees, and when and if
the new people play better ball, they should get better rewards.
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You know, the old American system is the bonus system. This
was before income taxes made it fashionable to convert bonuses to
stock options, both of which have the same general thrust. Reward
the good worker for his service by giving him very special extras
over and above his compensation. I am for that-and to be fair to
him, give him fair compensation to begin with, so that you don't punish
him even if he has bad luck; I mean, have a floor underneath him
and then give him incentive in the form of bonuses without end.
But it does seem to me that the investment company fellows have
for the first time introduced this brand new concept of giving manage-
ment a percentage of brick and masonry, that is, of all assets, without
regard to whether they are making productive use of them. This
is a brand new conception: if you are big enough, your reward goes
to you merely because of your size, even though your investor may
be suffering great losses, or not making profits, and I think con-
ceptually, philosophically, that's a completely wrong approach.
